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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the behavior of Pacific-Colombian fishermen in a Common-Pool Resource game. 
The results show that decision-making depends on fishermen's schooling, sex and last round payoffs. 
Focusing on individual information, we observe that human capital, measured in years of schooling, has 
a significant effect on decision-making. Specifically, players with higher schooling adjust their decisions 
towards on lower levels of harvest, leading closer to the cooperative solution. This behavior could be 
explained by the better-educated subjects’ improved understanding of the information available to them 
and possible coordination of efforts due to TURF-based management in the zone.  
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 Introduction 1.
 
Research on harvesting by conducting Common-Pool Resource (CPR) games has often focused 
on the nature and role of relevant institutions; while more recently, a behavioral economics 
approach has been increasingly adopted (Anderies et al., 2011), presenting findings concerning on 
how individuals process information, how they make decisions and how they respond to changes in 
incentive structures (Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner, 1992). Particularly, in most of the cases, the 
context adopted is a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), where the predicted outcome is Nash 
Equilibrium, unless players find ways for tacitly or explicitly cooperating. A popular research 
strategy has been to study the behavior of subjects in CPR-games with a static baseline framework 
inspired on a real-world situation relevant to the subjects’ every-day decision-making environment. 
In fact, some authors argue that individual behavior in such contexts reflects subjects’ preferences, 
values, and actual experience with the resource from their daily lives (Cardenas, 2001; Cardenas 
and Ostrom, 2004) 
Among the most robust findings these experiments have provided is that communication 
increases cooperation. This means that, when participants are allowed to communicate face-to-
face, the harvest declines towards the cooperative equilibrium (Ostrom and Walker, 1991; Ostrom, 
Walker and Gardner, 1992; Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, 1994). Some reasons for explaining this 
behavior can be found in that communication helps individuals to detect the actions of others with 
whom they are interacting, allowing individuals to elicit commitments, creating a process of 
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moralization among players and a sense of group identity. 
Following the results provided by Ostrom et al. (1994), many experiments have been run in 
Colombia with different findings. For instance, the perceived inequality in the group constrains the 
effectiveness of communication (Cardenas, 2003). Additionally, if the optimal decision for 
cooperative equilibrium is modestly enforced, the harvest is lower than if individuals were allowed to 
have face-to-face communication (Cardenas, 2001); even a combination of internal communication 
and external non-coercive intervention leads to better results (Moreno-Sanchez and Maldonado, 
2010). 
However, findings regarding the effect of individual information such as schooling on decision-
making have not been yet conclusive; i.e. is not yet clear whether education enhances willing to 
cooperate or defect in a collective-action problem. Although some conclusions reported that 
schooling and training have certain influence in reducing the harvest, because these more schooled 
individuals are open to accepting external interventions and rules aimed at the sustainable use of 
resources. Nevertheless, these variables showed a non-significant relation to harvesting (Moreno-
Sanchez and Maldonado, 2010).  
Besides, higher levels of education bring a greater commitment to sustainable harvest 
decisions (Arroyo-Mina, Revollo-Fernandez, Aguilar-Ibarra, and Georgantzis, 2016), enhance pro-
social values like reciprocity, inhibit antisocial behavior, enhance willingness to contribute to 
collective actions (Cardenas, Chong, and Ñopo, 2009; Brañas, Cardenas, and Rossi, 2009), and 
decrease free-riding (Brañas et al., 2009). 
However, education has a positive and significant relation to the harvest in the experiment 
when more schooled individuals have advantage over less schooled participants (Velez, Stranlund, 
and Murphy, 2009). Somehow, less schooled individuals may be unsure about their decisions and 
use the decisions of others as a guide to their own decision-making. This strategy is a sort of 
confirmation of a dominant preference leading to conditional cooperation.  
Experimental literature in the study of CPR-games has demonstrated that face-to-face 
communication and other external regulations lead to a higher probability to solve the commons 
dilemma, although findings on CPR-games and their education over Colombian villagers are not yet 
conclusive. However some findings from PD games have confirmed the impact of human capital on 
cooperative behavior (Schramm, 1998; Brosig, 2002; Burks, Carpenter, and Verhoogen, 2003; Tan 
and Zizzo, 2008;) and it is often observed that players with higher schooling are better at 
understanding repeated PD games, being able to cooperate even when they do not know each 
other, and play only once (Boone et al., 2002; De Jong, 2015). This behavior exhibits that players 
with higher schooling behave strategically in order to obtain better outcomes, rather than being 
more altruistic (De Jong, 2015).  
However, education is a key point for creating social capital (Putnam, 1995; Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2000; Fukuyama, 2002; Dinda, 2008) and development of human capital through 
education creates social capital as a positive externality (Lucas, 1988), partly because it enhances 
socialization and reinforces collective behavior (Almond and Verba, 1963; Paulsen, 1991).  
We are interested in contributing to this literature by explaining how these decisions are 
influenced by the accumulation of human capital measured by the years of formal schooling. For 
this purpose, this paper aims at explaining the findings of a set experiments performed in a 
Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURF’s) based management system in Choco Colombia by 
replicating social dilemmas (Ostrom et al., 1994; Cardenas, 2001) in a filed lab. Players are a set of 
fishermen, which perform a pen-and-paper CPR-game conducted in different villages of the Pacific 
Coast of Colombia,1 whose everyday activities involve resource-related decisions regarding the 
harvest of a CPR. Having no external rules, institutions nor enforcement, we find a negative 
                                                                            
1 This research was conducted within the project "Biodiversity Conservation of Utria National Park through the 
sustainable management of buffer zones," executed by MarViva in cooperation with Word Wildlife Fund (WWF 
Colombia), Natural Heritage (Fund for Biodiversity and Protected Areas) and United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), with the objective to define activities related to artisanal fisheries 
management agreements in the Gulf of Tribuga. Therefore, the results of this research may contribute to the 
design of programs for sustainable fishing in the area and strengthen the governance of local communities for 
the collective improvement. 
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relationship between the harvest in a CPR-game and a fisherman’s years of schooling; thus, 
development of human capital. 
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a discussion on 
the relation of TURF’s, and how this mechanism influence behavior of inhabitants Section 3 
presents the experimental design and procedures. Section 4 presents results. Section 5 provides 
the conclusions. 
 
 Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURF’s) in Colombia: ZEPA and DRMI 2.
 
In Colombia, Law 13 of 1990 proposed Exclusive Areas for Artisanal Fishing (ZEPA for its acronym 
in Spanish) and Regional Districts for Integrate Management (DRMI for its acronym in Spanish) for 
managing marine areas of fisheries. This law is proposed for complying with the principles and 
guidelines of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO, 1995), which establishes a 
set of principles to guide the management of fisheries resources towards sustainability (Vieira, 
Diaz, and Diaz, 2016).  
On the one hand, ZEPA process started in July 2008 by defining an area destined to the 
development of artisanal fishing, traditionally managed by communities inhabiting north coast of 
Choco Colombia, with initial validity of one year. Later in August 2009, its validity was extended for 
another year, and in August 2010, for two additional years Finally, declared permanently on July 
2013 (MinAgricultura, 2013). The designation of these 2.5 nautical miles wide between the northern 
limit of the Utria National Natural Park and the border with the Republic of Panama, alleviated in a 
certain way the rivalry between artisanal and the industrial fishing region (Diaz and Caro, 2016). 
On the other hand, DRMI process started more that 20 years ago (CODECHOCO et al., 2014) 
materialized in December 2014 (Vieira, Diaz, and Diaz, 2016), and legally established in October 
2017 (MinAgricultura, 2017). The declaration established a maritime extension of 55,974 hectares 
for exclusive extractive uses by the inhabitants of north coast of Choco, from Cabo Corrientes to 
Utria National Natural Park.  This declaration aims at regulating gears and arts of fishing in order to 
promote sustainability of hydro biological resources and other environmental goods and services 
that support fishing (Vieira, Diaz, and Diaz, 2016). 
The territorial designations of these geographic spaces, which connect to each other, were 
accompanied by workshops about sustainable exploitation, preservation, restoration, knowledge 
and enjoyment conducted along the communities. The objective of these workshops aims at 
maintaining the composition and function of natural capital accordingly to cultural values of 
inhabiting communities.  
These designations are defined as Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURF’s) with site-
specific management attached to territorial culture. By definition, these are extended economic 
zones, which rights can be controlled within the territory, with specific conditions for governing 
access to the resource by communities. TURF-based management systems provide relative rather 
than absolute controls, preventing the rent dissipation from economic waste due to excess of effort 
caused at allocating capital and labor (Christy, 1982). Thereby, under TURF-based management, 
users are responsible for defining and planning exploitation of resource and controlling access 
(Wilen, Cancino, and Uchida, 2012)  
Different studies have found TURF-based management increase compliance behavior of 
fishers and are supposed to correct the underlying causes of overfishing, the absence of well-
defined property rights; although impacts of TURF’s on the sustainability of fisheries are subject to 
debating (Nguyen Thi Quynh et al., 2017). Nevertheless, some studies have found that TURF-
based management coordinate fishing effort with the aim of mitigating inefficient allocation of fishing 
effort in Japan (Gaspart and Seki 2003) and Chile (Cancino, Uchida, and Wilen, 2007). 
Researches on communication, enforcement, co-management and compliance behavior are 
the most explore treatments in experimental economics. However, evidence regarding formation of 
human capital and the influence on behavior in the context of TURF’s has not received much 
attention. Nevertheless, some findings reported from CPR-games conducted in TURF-based areas 
show that harvest is negatively related to levels of schooling in Marine Protected Areas (MPA) in 
Colombia (Moreno-Sanchez and Maldonado, 2010), Management and Exploitation Areas of 
ISSN 2039-2117 (online) 
ISSN 2039-9340 (print) 
Mediterranean Journal of  
Social Sciences 
Vol 9 No 4 
July 2018 
          
 112 
Benthic Resource (MEABR) in Chile (Santis and Chavez, 2015), and Marine Reservoirs (MR) in 
Mexico  (Arroyo et al., 2016). 
 
 Experiment Design 3.
 
The design aims at studying the behavior of Colombian Pacific fishermen in a CPR-game 
performed in a field lab. These participants are inhabitants of collective territories, each one with 
knowledge and entitlement to engage in fishing activity. For this purpose, we use an experimental 
design similar to Ostrom et al. (1994) and Cardenas (2001) with a modification in the payoffs, 
without changing the main properties of the original setup. In this experiment, an agent has a range 
of choices between 1 to 8 units to harvest from a CPR. This choice could also represent units of 
effort applied to the resource or quantity of inputs used for yielding the resource.2 
 
3.1 Experiment protocol3 
 
The results reported in this study were obtained from pen-and-paper experiments run with 159 
fishermen recruited among the communities of the Colombian Pacific Coast during April 2012.4 In 
each session, groups of 5 players were formed, each one assisted by a researcher. Before starting 
the game, the context of the experiment and the rules to follow were presented to fishermen. During 
these experiments, anonymity was enforced. Decisions were made in secret, and even though 
many players knew each other, communication during the experiment was strictly forbidden. It was 
clearly explained to them that individual payoffs at the end of the session would depend on their 
own and rivals’ harvest. All payoffs were made effective at the end of each session.5 
 
3.2 Instructions and decisions 
 
Instructions and decisions sheets were provided to each fisherman, on which they had to indicate 
their harvest level in each period. They also had to annotate individual and aggregate harvest, but 
they were not offered feedback on the others' individual harvest. They were also offered a payoffs 
sheet indicating the earnings for different combinations between individual and collective harvest.  
Although each session consisted of a 20-period decision-making task, we focus here on the 
first 10 periods exclusively. Rounds 11-20 were dedicated to other research outside of the scope of 
this work.6 
In this experiment, individual harvest ranged between 1 ≤ xi ≤ 8 and aggregate harvest 
between 5 ≤ ∑xj ≤ 40 units. Then, as proposed by Cardenas (2001), individual payoff πi is given by: 
𝜋௜ ൌ 𝑓ሺ𝑥௜, ∑ 𝑥௝ െ 𝑥௜ሻ                                                         (1) 
which ranges between a minimum of 50 payoffs when individual harvest xi =1 and aggregate 
rivals’ harvest ∑xj -xi =32, and a maximum of 1730 payoffs when individual harvest xi=8, and 
aggregate rivals’ harvest ∑xj -xi = 4.7 
 
 Results 4.
 
In the experiment we ensure to have individual information from legal-aged fishermen who have 
                                                                            
2 The theoretical model implemented is adapted from Cardenas (2001) and described in detail by Georgantzis, 
Arroyo, and Guerrero (2013). 
3 In the Appendix Section, we provide details on the experimental protocol, instructions, and decision and 
payoffs sheet. 
4 These communities are Panguí, Coquí, Joví, Arusí, Termales, Nuquí, Jurubirá, Tribugá y El Valle. All of them 
are located in the Gulf of Tribuga. 
5  The accumulated experiment points of each participant were converted into a real monetary reward in 
Colombian Pesos, and paid at the end of the experiment. The average individual payoff was US$14. 
6 Regulations under uncertainty associated to climate change.  
7 Points are converted into Colombian Pesos: 1 point = $1 COP The exchange rate by date was around $1800 
COP/USD.  
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received earnings from the activity at least once in their lives. The information was privately 
collected through a semi-structured survey conducted at the end of the experiment. Some other 
prior descriptive analyses of the experiment are presented in this section. 
 
4.1 Descriptive analysis  
 
Table 1, contains descriptive statistics of the overall sample of 159 fishermen. These fishermen 
reported their age, years of schooling, payoffs obtained during the experiment and sex. In this 
sample 143 are men.  
 
Table 1: Summary of fishermen information 
 
Variable Average St. Deviation Min. Max. 
Individual harvest 4.560 2.188 1 8 
Years of schooling 6.214 3.869 0 16 
Payoffs per round 1,014.943 241.867 100 1,730 
Total payoffs 10,149.43 1,430.091 7,100 13,680 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Distribution frequency of year of schooling is presented in figure 1. Particularly, the highest-
occurring amount of years of schooling is grade 11. This indicates that the 25% of the participants 
have already finished high school. The second-most occurring amount of years of schooling is 
grade 5. This indicates that 15% of the participants have already finished elementary school. In this 
sample, two fishermen had a non-complete technician course, whereas one fisherman had 
obtained the technician degree.8  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of Years of Schooling in sample players 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
By running different local regression, we identify nonlinear relationships between harvest and 
explanatory variables; these patterns exhibit how players behaved during the CPR-game. 
 
                                                                            
8 In Colombia, a technician degree is an undergraduate program that takes up to three years of schooling. This 
program is not considered a Bachelor, which takes five years to be obtained. 
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Figure 2: Harvesting behavior 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
In figure 2, Panel a shows that average harvest increases when the difference in payoffs form past 
round is different than zero. Particularly, harvest tends to increase the higher when payoffs 
diminish. Panel b shows that players who have more years of schooling display a non-linear  
pattern of  diminishing average harvest. 
 
4.2 Statistical analysis 
 
We analyze longitudinal data obtained from individuals making decisions during the experiment, 
and demographic variables by estimating Pooled OLS clustering for players, random effects (RE) 
model, and a panel Tobit with lower limit 1 and upper limit 8. We estimated individual xi harvest as 
dependent variable. Squared lag of difference in payoffs is estimated as independent-explanatory 
variables. Finally we introduce years of schooling and sex as control variables. 
The variable years of schooling as a proxy of human capital is transformed into natural 
logarithms in order to capture the non-linear relation with harvest. Sex, s, is a dichotomous variable 
that takes values of 1 for male subjects, 0 otherwise. Finally, the squared lag of difference in 
payoffs identifies how incentives motivate decisions. The results of these estimations are presented 
in table 2. 
 
Table 2: Panel data estimations 
 
Variablea OLS RE Tobit 
Natural log. of schooling lsc -0.236** -0.236** -0.263** 
(0.099) (0.099) (0.151) 
Sex s 0.621** 0.631** 0.839** 
(0.278) (0.281) (0.412) 
Squared lag of difference l.dp2 7.78e-07 1.14e-06** 1.46e-06*** 
in payoffs (4.90e-07) (4.55e-07) (5.33e-07) 
Average harvest Constant 4.327*** 4.29*** 4.15*** 
(0.301) (0.305) (0.465) 
a Independent variable: Individual harvest xi 
*Statistically significant at 10%. **Statistically significant at 5%. ***Statistically significant at 1% 
 
Source: Own elaboration.  
ISSN 2039-2117 (online) 
ISSN 2039-9340 (print) 
Mediterranean Journal of  
Social Sciences 
Vol 9 No 4 
July 2018 
          
 115 
These results allow us to analyze the behavior of the fishermen during the first 10 rounds of the 
experiment, were no harvest levels are suggested nor enforced. As stated in the table 2, the years 
of schooling have a significant effect on players’ decision-making during the experiment exhibiting a 
negative relationship with the harvest.  
It is possible to assume that more schooled participants are led to reduce their harvest in the 
search of higher payoffs through a better understanding of the dynamics of the game, as Boone et 
al. (2002) state. Thereby, it is possible to conclude that players with more years of schooling 
assume that reducing harvest produces higher payoffs, and their decisions have led towards the 
cooperative solution. 
We presume that more schooled players make these decisions because of a better 
understanding of the information provided, and better processing the feedback from their own game 
interactions. This behavior could be explained by the cognitive advantage schooling brings to more 
educated players, in information processing and finally maximizing their well-being through problem 
solving and better adaptation to new situations (Bowen, 1977; Pallas, 2000; Pallas, and Jennings, 
2009). Considering this, the more schooled players can have better understanding of the 
information presented to them at the beginning of the experiment, especially regarding payoffs and 
how these are obtained. Due to this, players can have more accurate expectations of other players’ 
decisions.   
Furthermore, it is necessary to indicate that during the experiment, it is observed that players 
who develop basic cognitive abilities had a noticeable advantage for reaching better outcomes over 
those less schooled players. On the one hand, the less schooled players had some deficiencies in 
core subjects like reading, writing, and math. This indicates that a short schooling period had some 
immediate effect on players’ performance in the experiment. On the other hand, more schooled 
players had the ability to improve their results by taking the time to read and analyze the payoffs 
structure. It should be noted that during the sessions, more schooled players made math operations 
from time to time during every round, while less schooled players did not.  
By analyzing the difference in harvest during the experiment, we notice that tends to 
accumulate around 0, and strategies tend to remain in the same, deviating no more than 1 unit; on 
average Δ𝑥തതതത remains around 0.006, with an interval confidence at 95% significance -0.141< Δ𝑥തതതത < 
0.152; standard deviation 0.075. 
This behavior is denominated Schumpeterian ability to deal with payoffs disequilibria, in which 
players search for more profitable opportunities spatially dispersed in a region around their 
decision, and relocating at a given rate per period. This search consists in a random decision, in 
which the quantity of harvest is not subject to enforceable contracts; thus followed by one round of 
inspection and relocation to a new decision in its immediate neighbors with a higher harvest 
(Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne, 2003).  
However, players differ in their ability to identify and capture these disequilibria due to 
personal dispositions and capacities attributed to economic return of schooling and the 
enhancement of these abilities through education; this difference is denominated Allocative Effect 
of Schooling (Welch, 1970).  
Considering previous findings of Velez et al. (2009), and Moreno-Sanchez and Maldonado 
(2010), we cannot propose a conclusive reason why their results differ from ours. We can only 
partially attribute the difference to the context related to TURF-based management in the region in 
which population studied in our experiments inhabits. We can presume that the process of 
governance and management of the natural resource performed in the real-world decision-making 
context faced by our subjects may promote more sustainable exploitation of the resource. Thus, 
some of players bring this context to the game exhibiting differences from other individuals tested in 
experiments performed in other Colombian villages. 
Regarding sex of player, we observe that women’s harvest decisions are less competitive 
than men (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). 
The constant in this model provides the individual average harvest of participant when the 
remaining variables are zero during the rounds 1 to 10 of the experiment. This average ranges from 
4.15 to 4.33 depending on the estimation.  
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 Final Remarks 5.
 
This paper studies the behavior of fishermen from the Colombian Pacific in a CPR-game under a 
TURF-based management area. The findings show that human capital, measured by the years of 
schooling, has a significant negative relationship with the harvest. Under these results we consider 
that more schooled participants will diminish their harvest during the experiment leading to a 
cooperative solution. This process is endogenous and not motivated by external rules. We presume 
that the Allocative Effect of Schooling (Welch, 1970) and the effect of workshops conducted 
promoting sustainability in the region during the process of territorial management designation 
motivate this behavior. 
According to Becker (1964), Bowen (1977), and Pallas (2000), formal education enhances the 
human capital stock by enhancing the ability to solve problems and adapt to new situations.  In this 
experiment, it is observed that more schooled players presented an advantage over less schooled 
players, because, usually, more schooled players have the ability to effectively process payoff-
relevant information, possibly subject to a more efficient strategy searching process. 
It is also presumable that higher levels of schooling promote changes in preferences for the 
environment (Grossman and Krueger, 1995), and wealth effect promoted by higher human capital 
may change preferences for the environment in which fishermen are involved. Basically through a 
mechanism of transmission, we can presume that higher schooling increases the desire of 
fishermen for having better environmental and resource conditions 
Finally, the role of sex as a determinant for decision-making does not have conclusive results. 
Revollo-Fernandez, Aguilar-Ibarra, Saenz-Arroyo and Micheli (2016) provide evidence for a greater 
cooperative attitude in women by changing their behavior towards lower harvest in the presence of 
regulations, sanctions or social scolding. However, Maldonado and Barrero (2016) show that sex-
split groups show no statistically significant differences in the overall harvesting, although mixed 
groups of women and men exhibit lower harvesting of the resource. Nevertheless, Cardenas, 
Rodriguez and Johnson (2011) show that somehow more sex-homogeneous groups exhibit larger 
collective contributions. Findings obtained in this current research only allow us arguing that women 
exhibit less competitive behavior than men in a CPR-game with no enforcement introduced.  
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Appendix A. Protocol and instructions  
 
Appendix A1. Informative session 
 
In this session it is explained what is a common pool resource (CPR). Examples of these natural resources are 
presented, and concepts of rivalry and non-exclusion are explained. Then, the game is introduced, and each 
player decides whether participating or not. After forming groups of 5 players, the context of the game is 
presented, sheets of individual choice payoffs are provided (See Appendix B and C), and the rules to be 
followed are given. Therefore it is explained that the game does not allow interactions among players, as well as 
how the individual payoff is obtained. In this session players are explained that payoffs are going to be 
converted to money. After making this introduction, three practice rounds are performed so players may 
understand the dynamics of experiment. 
 
Appendix A2. Performance of experiment 
 
Players are allowed to freely harvest. The researcher of each group sums individual harvest at the end of each 
round and communicates the aggregate harvest. Then each player annotates the payoff on the sheet. This 
procedure was repeated 10 rounds.  
 
Appendix B. Individual Decision Sheet  
 
Player  
No.       
Age       
Sex       
Years of schooling      
     
Rounds A: Individual Harvest 
B: Aggregate Harvest of 
Group  
C (B-A): Aggregate Harvest 
from Rivals 
D: 
Payoff 
Practice 1         
Practice 2         
Practice 3         
1         
2         
3         
...         
10         
Total         
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Appendix C. Payoffs Sheet 
 
    MY AMOUNT OF HARVEST 
AG
GR
EG
AT
E 
HA
RV
ES
T O
F R
IV
AL
S 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
4  1,450  1,520 1,580 1,630 1,670 1,700 1,720 1,730 
5  1,400  1,470 1,530 1,580 1,620 1,650 1,670 1,680 
6  1,350  1,420 1,480 1,530 1,570 1,600 1,620 1,630 
7  1,300  1,370 1,430 1,480 1,520 1,550 1,570 1,580 
8  1,250  1,320 1,380 1,430 1,470 1,500 1,520 1,530 
9  1,200  1,270 1,330 1,380 1,420 1,450 1,470 1,480 
10  1,150  1,220 1,280 1,330 1,370 1,400 1,420 1,430 
11  1,100  1,170 1,230 1,280 1,320 1,350 1,370 1,380 
12  1,050  1,120 1,180 1,230 1,270 1,300 1,320 1,330 
13  1,000  1,070 1,130 1,180 1,220 1,250 1,270 1,280 
14 950 1,020 1,080 1,130 1,170 1,200 1,220 1,230 
15 900 970 1,030 1,080 1,120 1,150 1,170 1,180 
16 850 920 980 1,030 1,070 1,100 1,120 1,130 
17 800 870 930 980 1,020 1,050 1,070 1,080 
18 750 820 880 930 970 1,000 1,020 1,030 
19 700 770 830 880 920 950 970 980 
20 650 720 780 830 870 900 920 930 
21 600 670 730 780 820 850 870 880 
22 550 620 680 730 770 800 820 830 
23 500 570 630 680 720 750 770 780 
24 450 520 580 630 670 700 720 730 
25 400 470 530 580 620 650 670 680 
26 350 420 480 530 570 600 620 630 
27 300 370 430 480 520 550 570 580 
28 250 320 380 430 470 500 520 530 
29 200 270 330 380 420 450 470 480 
30 150 220 280 330 370 400 420 430 
31 100 170 230 280 320 350 370 380 
32 50 120 180 230 270 300 320 330 
 
